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Abstract 
We examine the validity of the guns versus butter hypothesis in the pre Arab Spring era. 
Using panel data from 1995-2011—the eve of the Arab uprisings—we find no evidence that 
increased security needs as measured by the number of domestic terrorist attacks are 
complemented by increased military spending or more importantly ‘crowd out’ government 
expenditure on key public goods such as health care. This suggests that both expenditure 
decisions were determined by other considerations at the government level. 
JEL Codes: C33, H52, H56, I15 
Keywords: military spending; public goods; expenditure trade-off; MENA 
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1. Introduction 
Do security incidents lead to increased military expenditure and lower investment in vital 
public services such as health care? The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provides an 
ideal context in which to examine this relationship. The region has been prone to conflict; 
high security needs and is home to six of the world’s top ten highest military spending 
countries. In addition, policy-makers and academics are searching for explanations of the 
2011 Arab uprisings or awakening and trying to understand how public policy decisions are 
made in the region. A more nuanced understanding of the policy making process in the region 
it is argued could help in more effective targeting of external donor funding for development 
and humanitarian assistance. 
The widespread policy and academic view is that in a region renowned for protracted 
conflicts and terrorism MENA policy-makers have prioritized military and security 
expenditures, which has led to the subsequent neglect of wider public policy and social 
welfare such as education and health, thereby increasing poverty and inequalities and creating 
the social and economic conditions for social unrest. It is argued that over the last forty years, 
Arab populations had accepted the ‘authoritarian bargain’ and the associated militarization of 
societies in return for domestic security at the expense of their social welfare and social 
mobility. However, the existing evidence is equivocal about the determinants of this 
relationship. The majority of studies have focused on OCED countries and provide mixed 
findings. Only a handful of studies have been identified in the MENA region, which find that 
increased military expenditure crowds-out welfare spending on health and crowds-in 
spending on education. 
In this paper, panel data for 18 MENA countries is collated from the World Development 
Indicators database of the World Bank. Security needs are estimated using data on casualties 
resulting from terrorist attacks (number of deaths and serious injuries). This is retrieved from 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provided by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Previous studies on the MENA region have 
not considered security incidents as a potential driver of military expenditure. In contrast to 
existing studies of the military social welfare expenditure nexus that focus on OECD 
countries and use simple correlation analysis, we provide an analytical framework based on 
regression analysis and the Panel Vector Auto Regressive model (PVAR) to systematically 
explore the trade-off between military and public health expenditures. 
2 
 
Using a panel data from 1995-2011—the eve of the Arab uprisings—we find no evidence that 
increased security needs as measured by the number of domestic terrorist attacks are 
complimented by increased military spending and thereby ‘crowd out’ and reduce 
government expenditure on key public goods such as health care. We validate these findings 
with four additional modeling approaches: Generalized methods of moments (GMM), 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), instrumental variable regressions, and Granger 
causality tests. The results indicate that, in the pre Arab Spring period 1995-2011, military 
expenditures did not lead to a decline in public health spending in the MENA region, which 
suggests that both expenditure decisions were determined by other considerations at the 
government level. Our results show that claims about the ‘warfare versus welfare / guns 
versus butter’ hypotheses in the MENA are not so straightforward as many political scientists 
and regional commentators would like to believe. This relationship and the potential causes 
of the Arab uprisings require a far more nuanced and evidence-based understanding of 
decision-making and the political economy of policy-making in the region. 
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we review the results from the 
literature on the guns and butter trade-off. In Section 3, we present some stylized facts on the 
military spending in the MENA region. In Section 4, we discuss the data and econometric 
methodology, while in Section 5, we present the empirical findings while results from 
robustness checks are relegated to the supplemental appendix. Finally, Section 6 provides 
some concluding remarks.                
2. Evidence of ‘Guns versus Butter’ 
Empirical evidence linking military and social expenditures assumes that defense spending is 
increased at the cost of other forms of public expenditure and concludes that “guns do come 
at the expense of butter” (Russett, 1969). The guns versus butter nexus defines a potential 
trade-off between military and social spending (e.g. public health, public education, welfare, 
etc.). The conclusion of Russett (1969, 1982) confirms what was, at the time, a widely held 
belief that spending on health and education is negatively affected by military expenditure, 
particularly during times of conflict. Russett’s (1969) analysis is based on US spending 
between 1939-68 alongside France and the UK, which returned similar results. However, in 
studying Canada, Russett (1969) returned a positive set of results and so paved the way for an 
array of literature and analysis over 50 years, which has not lead to a universal consensus for 
or against the ‘gun vs butter’ hypothesis. For instance, Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) employ a 
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SUR model in an effort to elucidate the relationship between military and social expenditures, 
focusing only on Turkey between 1924 and 1996. In line with the original theory, they also 
conclude that a trade-off exists between health and military spending; by contrast education 
spending indicated a positive relationship with military spending. They also propose that 
there is a sequential funding of health and education once military expenditure has been 
allocated. This idea was discussed by Deger (1985) who had issued a warning that 
notoriously elusive endogenous expenditure decisions should be afforded priority when 
investigating the trade-off.1  
The military-welfare trade-off has been documented in a number of studies following 
Russett’s (1969) seminal work (e.g. Peroff and Podolak-Warren, 1979; Deger, 1985; 
Apostolakis, 1992, among others). Russett (1982) utilized time series analysis of the US case 
from 1941-71 in which he found that no relationship exists between social spending and 
military spending. Furthermore, Verner (1983) examined 18 Latin American countries in a 
time series analysis with linear and non-linear regression models and found that only in El 
Salvador was there a trade-off, in seven countries there was no trade-off, whilst in 10 
countries a positive relationship was observed. It is clear then, the extant literature includes 
numerous analyses using a variety of methodologies in an effort to uncover conclusive 
evidence on the military-social trade-off. Moreover, the applied methodologies have, 
necessarily, become more nuanced and complex. 
The post-Cold War era has not as yet provided a rich mine of evidence for the military-social 
trade-off particularly in direct comparison to the Cold war era; Neuman (1994) suggests the 
complexity of analysis now required is a significant factor in its paucity.2 Combining cross-
sectional and panel data is recommended by Lin et al. (2015) in order to provide an accurate 
examination of the trade-off. It is proposed that this addresses statistical problems related to 
heterogeneity across countries. Their findings from 32 OECD countries between 1998 and 
2005 suggest that defense expenditures crowd out both health and education spending.  
However, they remain equivocal about the relationship within non-OECD countries. 
Similarly, Reeves and Stuckler (2013) examine the relationship between military and health 
spending in 31 OECD countries including Israel. They assert that Israel practices a sequential 
                                                          
1 The observation on sequential spending is also attributed to British Prime Minister Thatcher regarding the 
USSR and has subsequently been adopted by authors such as Reeves and Stuckler (2013) in their assessment of 
Israeli public spending priorities. 
2 Within the broader literature on the role of military expenditure, mixed evidence is found about the role of 
military expenditure and economic growth (Dunne, 1996; Dunne et al., 2005; Dunne and Tian, 2015; and 
d’Agostino et al., 2017). 
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spending principle which prioritizes military spending over other public spending due to its 
high security needs and high debt burden. 3  The initial assumption regarding sequential 
spending is refuted in their analysis of 31 OECD countries which demonstrated a positive 
correlation between military and health spending over the past 30 years (r = 0.16, p < 0.01)4. 
The authors conclude that there is “no inevitable crowding out of public health from defense 
among high-income countries”.5 Additionally, the analysis shows that if high security needs 
and debt burdens determined military spending, the consequence would be that, during 
recessions, health spending should be reduced while violent conflicts should increase military 
spending. The authors conclude that “in countries with high security needs, defense and 
health are complementary”.6 It is an interesting omission, however, that Israel is the only 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region country to be included in the analysis despite 
many neighbouring countries in the region reporting higher numbers of security incidents 
than Israel as well as the fact that six of the world’s top ten military spenders (percentage of 
GDP) are located in the MENA region (See Table 1).  
[Table 1 near here] 
Finally, Elbadawi and Keefer (2014) examine the determinants of military expenditures in 
140 countries using pooled OLS regression. They find that rising military spending in the 
MENA region is mainly due to increased security risks in the region. However, as their focus 
is to understand the nexus of democratization, regional politics, and military expenses, they 
do not consider trade-offs between military and other types of expenditure. 
3. Military spending in the MENA region 
Looking at Table 1, in overall military expenditure, the global average is 1.9% of GDP with 
Saudi Arabia being the only MENA country registered in the top ten spenders. However, as a 
percentage share of GDP, MENA countries occupy six of the top ten positions worldwide 
(UN-ESCWA, 2014: 137; SIPRI, 2014). Oman tops the list at 10.84% of GDP while Saudi 
Arabia spends 8.52% of its GDP. In terms of global priorities, countries tend to spend the 
most on education followed by health and then the military. In the MENA region, the priority 
is also education but the trend has been that of high spending on military and health; 
                                                          
3 Reeves and Stuckler p.1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid 3. 
6 Ibid 3 
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underlined by the fact that the MENA countries surpassed the global average on both (UN-
ESCWA 2013: 15, 2014: 136-137). 
Gaub (2014) states that “had Arab States adjusted their military budgets to European levels in 
1990—and maintained them—their economies would have grown by 2-3 per cent a year, and 
generated output levels over 50 per cent higher than at present.” Military expenditure in this 
regard is clearly seen as a heavy burden across the MENA region. A number of regional 
commentators have proposed that there is a clear trade-off between military and social 
expenditure although these assertions are based on limited evidence and simple correlation 
analysis (UN-ESCWA 2013: 167). To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of rigorous 
studies exist which examine the trade-offs in the MENA region. Bauwens (2012) examines 
eight countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia from 
1990-2009. By employing the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) regression model, the 
results highlight a trade-off between military spending and social spending. It is found that a 
one percentage point increase in defense spending as a share of central government 
expenditures decreases educational spending by 1.04% and health spending by only 0.16%. 
Ali (2011) documents the experience of Egypt from 1987 to 2005 using a seemingly 
unrelated regression estimation (SUR) model. The study finds that higher military 
expenditure crowds-out (lowers) health spending and crowds-in (increases) spending on 
education. In a panel study of 16 MENA countries from 1987 to 2005, Ali (2012) further 
notes that military expenditures were found to reduce income inequalities. Similarly, Yildirim 
and Sezgin (2002) using SUR estimation methods of Turkish data between 1924-1996 
document evidence of a trade-off (crowing out) between military expenditure and health 
spending. These studies comment that providing explanations and a conceptual framework 
for the findings is difficult. A variety of pathways could be considered. First, the unstable and 
conflict-prone environment which has come to dominate the region has provided the 
opportunity for elites and policy-makers to justify increased security and military spending 
particularly surrounding the need to curtail internal ‘terrorist’ threats, predominantly from 
militant organizations. Second, Ali (2012) argues that across the region the military and 
security services are so endemic within all aspects of a society and public services, which 
makes it challenging for researchers to extrapolate where exactly military spending begins 
and ends. For instance, which government entity deals with security incidents and counter-
                                                          
7 “Governments have focused almost exclusively on their own survival instead of the well-being of their own 
populations” (ESCWA 2013: 16). 
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terrorism efforts? In many MENA countries this is usually managed by the security services, 
not the military. This makes analysis of military spending challenging as it is difficult to 
disaggregate and know how much of it is linked to counter-terrorism rather than traditional 
defense. Government spending on military and social welfare may also be influenced by the 
foreign policies of external international powers, which aim to secure regional political 
stability at the expense of economic development and the social protection and wellbeing of 
domestic populations (UN-ESCWA 2013; Cammett et al., 2015).  
4. Data and econometric model 
4.1. Data 
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by Ali (2011, 2012) and Bauwens (2012) 
by providing new empirical evidence from the MENA region focusing on the relationship 
between military expenditure and health. In contrast to Reeves and Stuckler (2013) who use 
bivariate correlation analysis on OECD countries, we deploy multivariate regression analysis 
to explore the trade-off between military and health expenditures. We use annual data 
covering the pre- ‘Arab Spring’ period 1995-2011. The data spans 18 MENA countries: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia (KSA), Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. Data 
on total health expenditure defined as the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
military expenditure defined as the percentage of GDP are taken from the World 
Development Indicators database provided by the World Bank. Data on casualties resulting 
from terrorist attacks (number of deaths and serious injuries) is retrieved from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START). 
 
Ali (2012) recommends that in the analysis of the ‘warfare versus welfare’ hypothesis future 
studies should disaggregate social expenditures (education, health, food subsidies) in order to 
provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationship to military spending. In this article 
we therefore focus on health expenditure. 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the whole panel 
over the period 1995-2011. The average values of total health expenditure and military 
expenditure are around 5% of GDP in the MENA region. The average number of deaths and 
serious injuries caused by terrorist attacks is equal to 347 per country per year. 
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[Table 2 near here] 
   
Figure 1 plots the data on health and military spending in the MENA region in 2010. The 
negative relationship between military and health spending suggests that a trade-off exists. 
Countries with the highest level of military expenditure have the lowest levels of total health 
expenditure. More specifically, countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) seem to 
have the largest trade-off. Our results from a simple correlation analysis are in line with these 
patterns. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
4.2. Econometric model 
We use a vector autoregressive model with panel data (PVAR) to take into account the 
unobserved country heterogeneity in line with Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). The PVAR model, 
in contrast to the simple correlation test, fully exploits the panel data nature of our dataset by 
considering simultaneously time series and cross sectional dependencies. In addition to 
overcoming the inefficiency of the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), 
and random effects (RE) models, this model does not suffer from the omitted-variable bias 
found in these models. Instead, the PVAR model assumes that all variables are endogenous. 
An additional advantage of the PVAR model is that it captures dynamic features by 
considering the lagged dependent variable among the covariates.  
The first order PVAR model is represented as follows: 
1it it i ity y uα β ε−= + + +  (1) 
In equation (1) ity is a (3x1) vector of three variables [total health expenditure, military 
expenditure, casualties due to terrorist attacks]; 1ity −  is a (3x1) vector of the lagged variables 
[total health expenditure, military expenditure, casualties due to terrorist attacks]; α  is a 
(3x1) vector and β  is a (3x3) vector of the parameters to be estimated; iu  is a vector of 
country fixed effects; itε  a is vector of error terms. All the variables are considered to be 
endogenous ex ante.  
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In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need to impose the restriction that the 
underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is likely to 
be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is to allow for 
‘individual heterogeneity’ in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects. Since the 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables, the 
mean-differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would create biased 
coefficients. To avoid this problem we use forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the 
‘Helmert procedure’ (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). This procedure removes only the 
forward mean, i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each country-year. 
This transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged 
regressors.  
Before conducting the regression analysis, the statistical properties of the panel data used in 
the analysis are examined. We utilize three tests commonly adopted in the empirical literature 
to study the stationarity of the variables, which is a necessary step before estimating the 
relationships among the variables. This is done because using non-stationary variables may 
lead to spurious correlation. We run the panel versions of the classical Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), the Phillips-Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988), 
and Im- Pesaran-Shin (2003) tests. The null hypothesis for these tests indicates the presence 
of non-stationarity. The results of these tests are presented in Table 3. The results show that 
the health expenditures variable is not stationary in level but becomes stationary when taking 
the first difference, we conclude that it is integrated of order one, I(1). The military 
expenditures variable is not stationary when looking at the ADF test, but stationary when 
using alternative tests. Using all three tests, the terrorist attacks variable is found to be 
stationary in level and therefore is integrated at order zero, I(0). Given our stationarity tests, 
we use the first difference of log level (growth rate) for each variable when estimating our 
model for consistency. 
  
[Table 3 near here] 
We explore additional models and methods often used in the literature in the supplemental 
appendix as a robustness check. We first run a SUR regression since researchers often use 
SUR to model trade-offs across different spending categories (e.g., Anderson and Blundell 
1982; Ali 2011, Kiviet and Schipp 1995; Yildirim and Szegin 2002; Hessami 2014; Zellner 
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1962). In our case, we are interested in the trade-off between health and military expenditure. 
We thus run a system of two equations and allow for arbitrary cross-equation correlation to 
capture the impact of unobserved confounders that cause co-movement in both health and 
military expenditure. Terrorist attacks are considered an observable confounder. Second, we 
deploy in the appendix an instrumental variables framework in which the focal outcome is 
health expenditure and military spending is a potentially endogenous regressor. We introduce 
terrorism casualties as a plausible instrument for military expenditure, and use it to identify 
the effect of military spending on health spending. Finally, we use a Granger causality test. 
Here, we test if past spending of military spending can predict current health expenditure. 
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 4 presents the PVAR estimation results. The variable total health expenditure is 
regressed on its own lagged value, military expenditure, and casualties due to terrorist attacks 
variables. We find that military expenditure has a negative but insignificant impact on total 
health expenditure. Although the result is in line with the simple correlation test, the 
statistical insignificance of military expenditures suggest that the negative correlation is 
spurious and therefore the results do not lend support to the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis stating 
that governments that increase the military spending do so at the expense of their contribution 
to the total expenditure on health care in their respective economy. Taken together, our 
results indicate that, in the pre-Arab Spring period 1995-2011, military expenditures did not 
crowd out health expenditures in the MENA region, which suggests that both expenditures 
decisions were governed by other considerations at the government level. These results are 
also in contrast to those of Lin et al. (2015) who also use a regression analysis but for the 
OECD countries. Our results in Table 4 show that terrorist attacks and security incidents did 
not have any significant implications on the total health expenditure in the pre Arab Spring 
period. 
 
[Table 4 near here] 
The robustness analyses—outlined in the supplemental appendix—reinforce the main 
finding: military spending does not crowd-out health spending. In the SUR model, we find no 
evidence for terror casualties to affect either health or military expenditure. Furthermore, 
there is a residual positive (rather than negative as the guns-versus-butter trade-off would 
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suggest) correlation between health and military expenditure due to unobserved factors. In 
the instrumental variables regression, we find no evidence that changes in or levels of 
military expenditure affects health expenditure cuts. Lastly, Granger causality tests do not 
indicate that health and military spending can be predicted by each other, neither in levels nor 
in differences. Overall, these results lend overwhelming support to our main conclusion. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Many studies have explored the potential trade-off between military and social expenditures 
(see Zhang et al. 2016 for full review). Given the use of different methodologies, datasets and 
country contexts and histories, the evidence available is mixed. In this paper we attempted to 
address the methodological weaknesses found in previous studies and to provide new 
evidence from the MENA region, which contributes to shedding some light on potential 
drivers of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ and the policy making process in the region. 
We note one limitation of our study. A null-result does not prove the absence of a 
relationship. In other words, military spending might affect health spending via pathways that 
our models have not captured. It could be the case that if there has been any crowding-out 
effect of health spending that then it could have occurred in the past, pre-1995. Given that the 
region has been conflict prone during the last century—such as civil war in Yemen 1994, 
Gulf war 1990-1991, followed by the Iraqi uprising in 1991, KDPI insurgency in Iran 1989-
1996, Grand Mosque Seizure in Saudi Arabia 1979, Dhofar Rebellion in Oman 1962-1975, 
Lebanon civil war 1975-1990, Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988 and so the list continues—such a 
hypothesis carries substantial weight. The studies of Ali (2011) and (2012) using data from 
the MENA from 1987 to 2005 would lend support to this idea. However, empirically testing 
this hypothesis is difficult due to lack of reliable reporting of government expenditure data 
pre-1995 from across the 18 MENA countries. We thus consider that our study contributes to 
the bricolage of evidence from the region and provides additional insights to those of Ali 
(2011) and (2012) and the guns versus butter evidence base more broadly. The results can 
help orientate future research to explore the un-modeled pathways in the guns-versus-butter 
nexus, particularly in the MENA region.  
Our main finding is that the apparent trade-off reported between military and health spending 
is found to be spurious on the eve of the so-called Arab Spring (1995-2010). The analysis and 
results provide a cautionary note against the reliance on simple correlation analysis to draw 
important policy conclusions about the relationship between various government 
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expenditures as reported elsewhere (See for example UN-ESCWA 2013). Academics and 
policy makers should be careful in assuming that models and results from studies such as 
those of the OECD can be transplanted onto another region such as that of the MENA 
without consideration of the historical experiences and political economy factors. 
Determining the causes of unrest is a rather more complex empirical and policy task than 
envisioned by UN-ESCWA (2013) and those who claim there was an authoritarian bargain 
between MENA publics and their governments in order to main the status quo and security in 
region beset by conflict (Desai et al., 2011). Moreover, the results suggest that support of 
MENA governments for the military and security apparatus prior to the ‘Arab Spring’ did not 
seem to play a role in crowding out health expenditures: a finding that is contrary to that 
proposed by Lin et al. (2013). 
Further our results compliment those of Ali and Abdellatif (2013) who find in their study of 
military expenditure and natural resources in the MENA that the presence of regional conflict 
had no influence on rates of military spending. Our results further show that internal terrorist 
incidents and security needs had no effect on military expenditure. There are a number of 
possible explanations. It could be that this represents the fact that security needs and counter 
terrorism are not dealt with by the military and so would not be reflected in the expenditure. 
In many MENA countries, terrorism related threats are typically addressed by the ministries 
of interior or state security apparatus whose budget is not easy to disentangle from the 
aggregate national defense budget. Budgetary data on counter terrorism policies are difficult 
to access in the region given the political sensitivities. It could also be argued that security 
incidents and the occurrence of regional conflicts have become so normalized and routine in 
everyday life that their influence on policy making decisions has become negligible when 
compared to other countries such as those of OECD who are exposed (relatively) far less to 
terrorism and security incidents. In other words, in the MENA region it could that there has 
been a policy adaptation in which regional conflicts, high security needs and threats no longer 
are the main influence on government security and military spending decisions and which 
consequently could impact social welfare expenditures. To follow the finding of Reeves and 
Stuckler (2013) that ‘in countries with high security needs, defense and health are 
complementary’ we would caveat that this only applies to those countries which do not have 
a long history and experience of protracted conflict and security incidents. 
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Policy analysts and commentators on the region should not single out military or security 
spending and the prioritization as one of the main culprits for the lack of investment in public 
goods such as health and social protection more broadly. The results allude to the possibility 
that spending decisions on a vital public policy issue such as health are being made in silo, 
are determined by political will and not affected by other government priorities and needs. 
This is a rather simplistic interpretation but lends support for the need for more research 
insights both ethnographic and quantitative on the political economy of health and public 
policy in general in the region. Without this we will be unable to fully understand the main 
drivers of change and transition post 2011. The MENA region has become more unstable and 
experienced numerous violent conflicts such as in Syria, Yemen and Libya which have 
affected all countries in the region since 2011. What effects have these protracted conflicts 
had on government decision making in terms of social spending? Is the ‘warfare over 
welfare’ hypothesis a more accurate understanding of the situation since 2011? And have 
governments hunkered down and diverted government resources to defense and security as a 
response at the expense of the wellbeing and social welfare of their national populations? 
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Table 1. Top 10 military spenders  
Absolute 
Rank Country Millions of $ 
Relative 
rank Country 
Share 
of GDP 
Change 
in rank Country 
Percentage 
change 
since 2004 
1 USA 684489.2 1 Oman 10.84 1 Afghanistan 556.65 
2 China 148648.4 2 KSA 8.52 2 Azerbaijan 493.45 
3 Russia 73281.6 3 South Sudan 6.5 3 Iraq 284.46 
4 France 65263.6 4 Israel 6.14 4 Kazakhstan 247.93 
5 UK 60294.2 5 UAE 5.18 5 Ghana 243 
6 Japan 59638.4 6 Jordan 4.64 6 Georgia 229.85 
7 KSA 52019.2 7 USA 4.5 7 Liberia 189.13 
8 India 49261.2 8 Algeria 4.2 8 Algeria 176.21 
9 Germany  49080.4 9 Lebanon 4.2 9 Angola 175.12 
10 Italy 37025.2 10 Afghanistan 4.08 10 Ecuador 174.71 
Reproduced from ESCWA (2014: 136) Source: SIPRI, 2014. 
Notes: “Millions of $” (expressed in constant 2011 USD) and “share of GDP” are the five-year averages from 
2009 to 2013. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of variables, MENA region, 1995-2011 
 N Average Standard 
Deviation 
Min  Max 
Total health expenditure a  303     4.69 2.01 1.12 11.45 
Military expenditure b  271     4.81 2.74 0.92 14.62 
Casualties due to terrorist attacks c  306     347 1635 0 15309 
  Notes: a, b Percentage of GDP.  c Number of deaths and serious injuries. 
 
 
Figure 1. Health and military expenditures in MENA countries, 2010 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
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Table 3. Panel stationarity tests of variables 
Notes: The null hypothesis for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Phillips-Perron (PP), and Im-
Peseran-Shin tests (IPS) is the presence of non-stationarity in all panels. p-values are reported. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation results (Panel vector autoregressive model) 
Dependent variable: Total health expenditure 
Lagged dependent variable 0.082 
 (0.101) 
Military expenditure  -0.003 
 (0.052) 
Casualties due to terrorist attacks -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Number of observations 215 
Notes: Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent 
variables are lagged at order 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Levels First differences 
Variables ADF PP IPS ADF PP IPS 
Total health expenditure 0.764 0.636 0.528 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Military expenditure 1.000 0.000 0.051 0.678 0.000 0.000 
Casualties due to terrorist attacks 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Supplemental appendix 
To probe the robustness of our main findings, we present estimation results under alternative assumptions on the 
data-generating process. The models presented below are more specific than the PVAR models in the main text. 
A key concern is that with just 18 countries and 17 years in the sample, it is difficult to find significant results 
with too flexible estimators. Furthermore, the low number of observations limits us to a few additional tests. 
Following established practice and the results of our unit root tests, we estimate autoregressive distributed lag 
models in error correction representation throughout. In these models, the dependent variable is expressed in 
differences, while its lagged level is being controlled for. 
We examine permutations of the following three dimensions: 
• Data-generating process: We consider two alternative models that impose some structure upon the fully 
flexible PVAR model. 
• Control variables: We consider two sets of control variables—the empty set (as in the main text) and a 
set of basic controls, including (logged) terror casualties, infant mortality, and (logged) external 
resources for health. 
• Dependent variables: We consider two dependent variables—(logged) health expenditure (% GDP) and 
(logged) out-of-pocket health expenditure (% health expenditure). 
Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics of all (untransformed) variables. 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
Health expenditure (% GDP) 303 4.69 2.01 1.12 11.45 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure (%) 303 36.78 19.33 10.11 99.61 
Military expenditure (% GDP) 271 4.81 2.74 0.92 14.62 
Terror casualties 306 347.06 1635.17 0 15309 
Infant mortality 306 23.64 15.12 5.60 79.50 
External resources for health 303 1.50 4.69 0.00 58.62 
 
A.1. Seemingly-unrelated regression   
Our first set of additional robustness tests makes the simplifying assumption that changes in health expenditure 
and military expenditure are both outcomes of interest that can be individually studied, but unobserved ‘third 
variables’ can induce spurious correlation between these two outcomes. Terrorist attacks are assumed to be 
exogenous. This data-generating process can be conveniently modelled with a seemingly-unrelated regression 
(SUR) system.  
In a SUR system, standard errors are allowed to correlate across equations. A positive correlation would indicate 
the presence of an unobserved factor that induces increases in both outcomes of interest, while a negative one 
indicates countervailing effects. For example, it is plausible to argue that a change in government ideology 
toward a more hawkish stance could decrease health expenses while increasing military expenditure. The SUR 
framework allows us to detect cross-outcome correlation without the need to measure its sources. 
Table A2 presents the results when using health expenditure and military expenditure as our main dependent 
variables. Consistent with the main analysis, we find no evidence of crowding-out between health spending and 
military expenses. In fact, the cross-outcome correlation is estimated to be significantly positive (p<0.01). This 
suggests existence of an unmeasured variable that positively relates to both types of spending. For example, 
spending on police forces is a likely confounder. To avoid future terrorist attacks, the government likely spends 
on both military and the police force including its counterterrorism units.  
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Turning to control variables, we do not find evidence for significant relationships between terror casualties and 
health expenditure and military expenditure respectively. In contrast, external resources for health substitute for 
domestic health spending as well as military spending (p<0.01). A higher lagged level of infant mortality is 
negatively related to the growth in health expenditure, most likely because states with problems to expedite 
health spending have weak state capacity to begin with. This interpretation—lack of absorptive capacity—is 
also consistent with the negative coefficient on the level of external resources for health in both equations. In 
sum, the models are reasonably specified, explaining about one-third of the variation in health expenditure 
change. 
Table A2. SUR results using health expenditure 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)              
 
b se b se b se 
∆.Health expenditure 
     
             
L.Health expenditure -0.252*** (0.025) -0.283*** (0.053) -0.334*** (0.059) 
∆.Terror casualties 
  
0.017 (0.012) 0.015 (0.010) 
L.Terror casualties 
  
0.021 (0.019) 0.018 (0.017) 
∆.Infant mortality 
    
-0.062 (0.040) 
L.Infant mortality 
    
-0.007** (0.003) 
∆.External resources 
    
-0.010*** (0.001) 
L.External resources 
    
-0.008*** (0.001) 
∆.Military expenditure 
     
             
L.Military expenditure -0.337*** (0.047) -0.341*** (0.049) -0.355*** (0.049) 
∆.Terror 
  
-0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) 
L.Terror 
  
0.002 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) 
∆.Infant mortality 
    
-0.045 (0.051) 
L.Infant mortality 
    
-0.005 (0.005) 
∆.External resources 
    
-0.011*** (0.002) 
L.External resources 
    
-0.007* (0.004) 
Cross-outcome correlation 0.46*** 
 
0.47*** 
 
0.43***              
Observations 287 
 
287 
 
285              
Within R-squared 0.29 
 
0.31 
 
0.36              
Notes: SUR system of equation estimation using maximum likelihood. Both 
equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
Table A3 repeats the analysis from Table A2 but using out-of-pocket health expenditure as the first outcome of 
interest. The main conclusions from the analysis are unaffected. Conditional on observed control variables, both 
outcomes are not significantly correlated with each other (the point estimate is close to zero). The coefficients of 
terror casualties are not significant. In terms of additional controls, we find that an increase in the growth of 
external resources for health positively relates to an increase in the out-of-pocket share of health expenditure 
(p<0.01). This can again be taken as suggestive evidence that governments reduce public health expenditure 
when external resources are ready to fill the gap.  
Table A3. SUR results with out-of-pocket health expenditure 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)              
 
b se b se b se 
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∆.Out-of-pocket expenditure 
  
             
L.Out-of-pocket expenditure -0.087*** (0.020) -0.087*** (0.021) -0.130*** (0.016) 
∆.Terror casualties 
  
-0.195 (0.388) -0.166 (0.373) 
L.Terror casualties 
  
-0.034 (0.343) 0.037 (0.328) 
∆.Infant mortality 
    
-0.783 (1.269) 
L.Infant mortality 
    
-0.231 (0.141) 
∆.External resources 
    
0.191*** (0.027) 
L.External resources 
    
0.211*** (0.051) 
∆.Military expenditure 
  
             
L.Military expenditure -0.298*** (0.051) -0.297*** (0.051) -0.312*** (0.054) 
∆.Terror casualties 
  
-0.006 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) 
L.Terror casualties 
  
-0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) 
∆.Infant mortality 
    
-0.026 (0.051) 
L.Infant mortality 
    
-0.004 (0.005) 
∆.External resources 
    
-0.012*** (0.002) 
L.External resources 
    
-0.008** (0.004) 
Cross-outcome correlation -0.05 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.01 
 Observations 287 
 
287 
 
287 
 Within R-squared 0.10 
 
0.10 
 
0.14 
 Notes: SUR system of equation estimation using maximum likelihood. Both 
equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
A.2. A direct test of the crowding-out hypothesis  
In a second set of analyses, we consider health expenditure as our unique outcome of interest and military 
expenditure to be a (potentially endogenous) regressor. This setup allows us to directly assess whether there is a 
significant negative correlation between the two variables (equivalent to a crowding-effect). We are not 
concerned about reverse causality as a source of endogeneity (a negative correlation is evidence of crowding-
out). However, we must beware of endogeneity due to omitted variables. A standard solution to this is an 
instrumental-variable design, in which we try to find a variable that correlates with military expenditure but 
affects health expenditure only through its effect on the former.  
Terror casualties are not an implausible instrument. Assuming that casualties are never significant enough to 
directly cause increases in public health spending, they are theoretically strongly related to military spending 
because governments can use terrorism as a pretext to reallocate scarce public resource to the military (Daoud 
2011, 2017, 2018). Our approach in this set of analyses hence is to instrument military spending with terror 
casualties and study whether (predicted) military spending is negatively related to health expenditure.  
Table A4 shows the results for health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. We find that there never is a 
significantly negative relationship between military spending and health expenditure (in fact, in the last two 
models, it is positive). Yet, we caution against over-interpretation of these findings because the instruments are 
weak, considering conventional levels of statistical significance. Neither are any of the control variables 
significant. 
Table A5 repeats the analysis using out-of-pocket health expenditure as outcome of interest. The results are 
similar, at the exception of the first model in which the coefficient on the level of military expenditure is 
negatively related to the change in health spending. This is not evidence of crowding-out though. 
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Table A4. IV design using health expenditure 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)              (4)              
 
b se b se b se b se 
∆.Health expenditure 
       
             
L.Health expenditure -0.291*** (0.081) -0.329*** (0.087) -0.291*** (0.081) -0.329*** (0.087) 
∆.Military expenditure -1.018 (0.871) -1.084 (1.452) -0.994 (0.983) -0.959 (0.913) 
L.Military expenditure 0.801 (4.698) 1.036 (4.178) 0.196*** (0.053) 0.200*** (0.050) 
L.Infant mortality 
  
0.005 (0.048) 
  
-0.004 (0.005) 
L.External resources 
  
0.002 (0.013) 
  
-0.000 (0.004) 
L.Military expenditure 
       
             
L.Terror casualties -0.003 (0.016) -0.001 (0.012) 
   
             
∆.Terror casualties -0.000 (0.006) -0.000 (0.008) 
   
             
L.Infant mortality 
  
-0.011 (0.014) 
   
             
L.External resources 
  
-0.002 (0.007) 
   
             
∆.Military expenditure 
       
             
∆.Terror casualties -0.006 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
L.Terror casualties -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 
L.Infant mortality 
  
0.001 (0.002) 
  
0.001 (0.002) 
L.External resources 
  
0 0 
  
0.001 (0.003) 
Cross-equation correlation -1.05 
 
-1.05 
 
1.35* 
 
1.32***              
Observations 260 
 
259 
 
253 
 
252              
Within-R2 0.42 
 
0.43 
 
0.40 
 
0.40              
Notes: Recursive system of equations, estimated using maximum likelihood. Military expenditure is 
modelled using terrorist casualties in levels and differences as instruments. Models 1-2 instrument 
both level and difference in military expenditure. Models 3-4 only instrument the difference. All 
equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
Table A5. IV design using out-of-pocket expenditure 
 
(2) 
 
(3)              (4)              
 
b se b se b se 
∆.Out-of-pocket expenditure 
     
             
L.Out-of-pocket expenditure -0.210*** (0.029) -0.210*** (0.031) -0.210*** (0.029) 
∆.Military expenditure -35.534 (38.769) -32.953 (26.375) -35.112 (27.453) 
L.Military expenditure -7.754** (3.480) -0.181 (1.234) -0.385 (1.267) 
L.Infant mortality -0.143 (0.121) 
  
-0.061 (0.136) 
L.External resources -0.015 (0.278) 
  
-0.003 (0.259) 
L.Military expenditure 
      L.Terror casualties -0.001 (0.017) 
   
             
∆.Terror casualties -0.001 (0.006) 
   
             
L.Infant mortality -0.011 (0.014) 
   
             
L.External resources -0.002 (0.007) 
   
             
∆.Military expenditure 
      ∆.Terror casualties -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) 
L.Terror casualties -0.007* (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) 
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L.Infant mortality 0.001 (0.002) 
  
0.001 (0.002) 
L.External resources 0.001 (0.003) 
  
0.001 (0.003) 
Cross-equation correlation -0.12 
 
1.25** 
 
1.31* 
 Observations 259 
 
253 
 
252 
 Within-R2 0.19 
 
0.22 
 
0.23 
 Notes: Recursive system of equations, estimated using maximum likelihood. 
Military expenditure is modelled using terrorist casualties in levels and 
differences as instruments. Models 1 (equivalent to A4) dropped due to non-
convergence. All equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
A.3. Granger causality test 
A final test to demonstrate that health expenditure and military expenditure are not related to each other in our 
sample is a Granger causality test. For instance, if past realizations of military spending could predict current 
health expenditure (controlling for past health spending), but past realizations of health spending would not 
predict current military expenditure (controlling for its past realizations), then military spending Granger-causes 
health spending. 
We do not find evidence for variable to Granger-cause the other, neither in levels, nor in changes (Table A6). 
This is additional supportive evidence for our main finding that there is no crowding-out between the two 
variables.  
Table A6: Granger tests 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4)              
 
Health expenditure Military expenditure Health expenditure Military expenditure 
 
b se b se b se b se 
Levels 
        L.Health 0.608*** (0.078) 0.035 (0.094) 
   
             
L2.Health 0.092 (0.095) 0.138 (0.116) 
   
             
L3.Health 0.043 (0.073) -0.038 (0.089) 
   
             
L.Military 0.100 (0.067) 0.775*** (0.084) 
   
             
L2.Military -0.098 (0.080) -0.233** (0.099) 
   
             
L3.Military 0.031 (0.060) 0.071 (0.074) 
   
             
Differences 
        L.Health 
    
-0.346*** (0.084) -0.006 (0.103) 
L2.Health 
    
-0.222*** (0.082) 0.091 (0.102) 
L3.Health 
    
-0.072 (0.083) -0.023 (0.106) 
L.Military 
    
0.132** (0.065) -0.068 (0.086) 
L2.Military 
    
0.016 (0.065) -0.296*** (0.083) 
L3.Military 
    
-0.044 (0.063) -0.205*** (0.078) 
N 222 
 
216 
 
204 
 
198              
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
